Over eight months earlier, another meeting of senior officials had taken place which, although its outcome was in many ways just as horrendous as that of the Wannsee Conference, has garnered comparatively little attention. On Friday, 2 May 1941, a little over seven weeks prior to the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, those officials responsible for formulating Germany's economic policy in the eastern territories met in Berlin to discuss the tasks which lay before them. The minutes of this gathering, which graphically describe the conclusions reached there, have survived in two parts, both bearing the date of 2 May 1941. They 2. As a result, x million people will doubtlessly starve, if that which is necessary for us is extracted from the land.
3. Of greatest importance is the recovery and removal of oilseed, oilcake, [and] only then grain. The available fat and meat will in all probability be consumed by the troops. 4. Industrial activity is only to be resumed in areas of shortage, e.g. transportation works, works for general supply plants (iron), textile works, only those armaments firms for which bottlenecks exist in Germany.
The setting-up of workshops for the troops [is] of course [to take place] on an increased scale.
5. For the securing of the vast areas between the main transit roads, special troops must be made available, perhaps the RAD [Reich Labour Service] or supplementary army formations will be incorporated.
It is necessary to select the areas which are of particular importance and are, therefore, to be protected. ' Discussion [of the] Staatssekretare 2.5.41.
1. Directive from the Fiiuhrer for the Reich Marshal [Hermann Goring] (in accordance with attachment 1) must finally be signed.
Furthermore, the same applies to the letter from the Reich Marshal for the Army C-in-C [Walther von Brauchitsch] (attachment 2).
2. Main transit roads and securing of those areas which lie between them for the purpose of agricultural exploitation. 3. Provision of uniforms for the people in the civilian sector.
The industrial leaders with the insignia of an industrial leader as special leader and greyish-silver arm stripes, the agriculture [officials] in civilian clothing with greyish-silver arm stripes, in the event that they are not entitled to wear the uniform of an officer.2
In an alarmingly matter-of-fact way, those present at the meeting declared that 'x million people' in the soon-to-be-occupied territories of the Soviet Union would have to starve to death if Germany was to win the war. It was intended that starvation on this scale would create a surplus of foodstuffs in the occupied East, which would be used first and foremost to feed Germany's armed forces during the third year of the war (i.e. September 1941 to August 1942), above all those three million soldiers serving on the Eastern Front. Eliminating the necessity of supplying three million men with particularly high rations directly from the Reich would ease the pressure placed on the existing transport routes between Germany and the Soviet territories for the duration of the war in the East, as well as on food stocks in Germany and German-occupied Europe as a whole, thereby contributing to Germany's economic capacity to fight the expected war of attrition against the Anglo-Saxon powers. From the point of view of those who envisaged it, the importance of this ruthless approach in the occupied East cannot be overestimated.
The conclusions reached by those attending the meeting on 2 May 1941 signified the approval of the relevant sections of the German ministerial bureaucracy for a strategy which had been in the process of being developed -above all by Staatssekretir Herbert Backe (1896-1947) and his closest colleagues in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and the Reich Food Estate -since the beginning of the year.3 As described in the policy guidelines produced by agricultural experts in the wake of the meeting of 2 May, this strategy envisaged the physical division of the Soviet territories according to Kay: Germany's Staatssekretidre, Mass Stawrvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941 687 agricultural productivity, whereby those regions producing food surpluses (socalled 'surplus territories', namely Ukraine, southern Russia and the Caucasus) would be detached from those which did not (so-called 'deficit territories', namely northern and central Russia and Belarus) and whose inhabitants were, therefore, dependent on the former for their food supply.4 The minutes of the meeting of 2 May made explicit what had been inherent in the strategy from the beginning, namely that millions of Soviet citizens were bound to die if this concept were to be implemented. With the agreement evidently reached during this discussion and recorded in the minutes, yet another moral threshold had been crossed by the National Socialist regime.
Of those foodstuffs available in the Soviet Union in large amounts, oilseed, oilcake and grain were to be put at the top of the list of commodities to be plundered. The emphasis placed on the 'recovery and removal' of these items indicates that a significant proportion of the amounts confiscated was to be transported back to the Reich, unlike fat and meat, which would 'in all probability be consumed by the troops' engaged in combat and administrative duties in the occupied East. It can be seen from the minutes that the aim in the industrial sector was by no means to resurrect the infrastructure in the Soviet territories as soon as possible. Instead, industrial activity was only to be resumed in those areas in which there were shortages in the German war economy, for example, in transportation, iron and textile works, armaments and the setting-up of workshops for the troops. Priorities were to be set, with emphasis placed on those products which were of crucial importance to the German war effort. The belief that the Soviet Union ought to return to being a predominantly agricultural land, as it had been prior to the first world war, and the German leadership's intention to bring this about, are implicit in the downplaying of the importance of the industrial infrastructure of the Soviet territories.
Securing the 'main transit roads' and surrounding areas would ensure that the troops advancing eastwards along these routes could live 'off the land', a phrase used repeatedly by the economic planners. The second, and far less striking, part of the minutes appears to cover in the main those issues which were earmarked on 2 May to be dealt with further in the days and weeks following the discussion, and perhaps prior to a follow-up meeting. The mundane was mixed with the murderous at this gathering, as the final point -the provision of uniforms for non-military personnel in the occupied Soviet territories -makes clear.
Beyond the main conclusions reached at the meeting, it is also possible to derive from the minutes something about the form and importance of the gathering. The heading given to the first and main part of the minutes reads: 'Memorandum on the result of today's discussion with the Staatssekretire regarding Barbarossa'. The congregation of Staatssekretiire -roughly equivalent to the grade of permanent secretary in the British civil service -became an important aspect of governance in National Socialist Germany following the abandonment of formal cabinet meetings at the end of 1937. Thereafter, Hitler practically forbade his ministers to assemble independently. The Secret Cabinet Council, set up by 'decree of the Fiuhrer' on 4 February 1938, proved to be a non-starter. Its nominal purpose was to advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy, but it could only be summoned by him and was not able to convene a meeting itself. As Hitler never summoned it, the council never met.5 Recent attention has turned to the importance of the regular conferences of the Reichs-and Gauleiter -which often lasted for several days -as a means of disseminating information and co-ordinating policy, and as an opportunity for exchanging viewpoints with Hitler and other senior figures in the Nazi Party.6
Despite the obvious value of these conferences, not least in terms of the continuous issuing of directives which evidently took place there, it appears that the interchange of ideas was limited to discussions in pairs or in small groups,7 thereby failing to offer a wider forum for debate. In view of this, the Staats- In contrast to the extensive coverage of the Wannsee Conference in the historiography, however, the meeting of 2 May 1941 and its minutes have remained fairly obscure. Given the obvious similarities between the two gatherings, this difference in treatment is rather striking. Both were in effect meetings of the relevant Staatssekretaire, i.e. ministers' deputies. At both meetings the main topic on the agenda was the murder of millions of human beings and how this could be brought about. The target group discussed at Wannsee was over eleven million Jews spread across the entire European continent. At the meeting on 2 May, although somewhat vaguely referred to in the minutes as 'x million', the target group was in fact 'many tens of millions' of Soviet citizens, as stated in the economic policy guidelines drawn up and issued exactly three weeks later by some of those present at the meeting on 2 May.9 Various other Kay: Germany's Staatssekretdre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1 94 1 689 sources provide a more exact figure of 30 million,'0 almost three times as many as those slated to be killed by the men present at the Wannsee Conference. It was no coincidence that 30 million was the number by which the Soviet population -exclusively the urban population in fact -had grown between the beginning of the first world war in 1914 and the beginning of the second world war in 1939."1 It was this very process of industrialization and urbanization which the German leadership sought to reverse as a way of providing a long-term agricultural base in the occupied East for German-dominated continental Europe. What one is dealing with here is the blueprint for a programme of mass murder unprecedented in modern history.
Given that the first part of the minutes was used as evidence at the trials of the major war criminals at Nuremberg immediately after the end of the second world war, the relative neglect of the 2 May meeting and its minutes cannot be explained by the recent unearthing of the minutes. Little over a decade after the Nuremberg trials, the meeting and its minutes were already referred to in the secondary literature,2 and in the last 15 years they have been increasingly placed in their wider context. Nevertheless, as one historian recently remarked, 'the full significance [of the minutes] for the subsequent occupation policy in the Soviet Union has barely been recognized'.'3 Whereas scores of articles and books have dealt exclusively with the Wannsee Conference (and rightly so), this other far-reaching meeting of the German Staatssekretaire has failed to be the subject of one single study. In light of the magnitude of the welldocumented German plans to conquer, exploit and colonize the European part of the Soviet Union, and the massive implications this meeting had for German occupation policy, this is somewhat surprising. The most likely explanation for this, however, is that the brevity of the minutes and the absence of a list of participants similar to that contained in the Wannsee Protocol have discouraged historians from focusing in depth on the conference.
Having discussed the conclusions reached at the meeting of 2 May and the nature of the gathering itself, and placed both the meeting and its minutes in their immediate context, this article will now concern itself principally with As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, it was Reich Marshal Hermann Goring whom Hitler had already made responsible for the entire economic administration in the soon-to-be-occupied Soviet territories by the time the 2 May meeting took place. Who, however, was responsible for the sentiments contained in its minutes? Who attended on 2 May? The absence of a list of participants means that the presence of any one person cannot be determined with absolute certainty. The piecing together of other sources and a certain degree of supposition are, therefore, required.
Only two copies of the minutes were produced. The first was for the files of this small management committee -not to be confused with the aforementioned Economic Staff East, which was directly subordinated to it -was headed by Reich Marshal Goring in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and directed on his behalf by his deputy Staatssekretir Paul Korner (1893-1957). Instructions and orders from Goring for LieutenantGeneral Schubert were issued through Thomas. Given that the two copies of the minutes were for Generals Thomas and Schubert, the meeting of 2 May was likely to have been a formal meeting of the organization tasked with formulating economic planning for the forthcoming invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union.
The fact that this was a 'discussion with the Staatssekretaire regarding Kay: Germany's Staatssekretire, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May I 94 1 69 I Barbarossa' has led some historians to conclude that it was a session of the General Council for the Four-Year Plan,'4 which was nominally headed by Goring and made up primarily of Staatssekretare recruited from those ministries which played a prominent role in the running of the German economy.
What makes this highly unlikely, however, is the fact that Staatssekretir Korner opened the eleventh session of the General Council on 24 June 1941 by informing the other participants that the convening of the General Council had not been able to take place 'until now' as a result of the preparations for Operation Barbarossa. He then proceeded to report to those present on the work of the Economic Command Staff East.'5 Unlike the General Council for the Four-Year Plan, the Economic Command Staff East had already held its fourth session on 26 May.'16 In all likelihood, the meeting of the Staatssekretiire on 2 May was an official session of this committee.
At the meeting of the Economic Command Staff East on 26 May, a total of 17 men were present. Only a handful of these, however, were in fact permanent members of that committee. Alongside Goring, Korner and Thomas, reference in his entry to any alteration in the original plans, it would be rather presumptuous to assume that this inconsistency was the result of an error on Rosenberg's part and that the discussion had in fact taken place on 2 May.
Although the possibility that he was referring to a second meeting with Korner and Thomas -the first being in the company of the Staatssekretare a day earlier, on 2 May -should not automatically be ruled out, it does not seem very probable. Nevertheless, even if Rosenberg did not attend the meeting on 2 May, but rather discussed its results with Korner and Thomas the day after, it is certain that he approved of what he heard. He described the discussion as Beyond the reference in Rosenberg's diary to consultations between Staatssekretair Backe and Gauleiter Meyer on 2 (or 3) May, there is good reason to believe that Backe attended the meeting of the Staatssekretire on 2 May. As author of the strategy which envisaged the starvation of millions of Soviet citizens in order to manufacture food surpluses artificially to supply the invading troops and the German home front, Backe's failure to attend such an important meeting on the subject would have been almost unthinkable. In addition, with Hitler's knowledge and approval, complete powers over the agricultural exploitation of the Soviet territories had been transferred to him on 12 April.28
Although Reich Marshal Goring was nominally in charge of the Economic
Command Staff East and has been described in the literature as a 'certain participant' of the 2 May conference,"29 it can, on the contrary, be established with certainty that he did not, in fact, attend. In the second part of the minutes to the meeting, it was noted: 'Directive from the Fiihrer for the Reich Marshal 25 Rosenberg's diary entry for 6 May. Most of the institutions represented at the conference had a direct interest in the agricultural and logistical gains to be made from the successful implementation of a programme of mass starvation. The presence of two members of the Food Ministry is natural, given that the idea originated there and that this institution was responsible for food issues in the Reich and, by extension, in German-occupied Europe. The fact that those troops serving in the East were to be the primary beneficiaries of the 'starvation policy' is sufficient to explain why the military was represented at the meeting by up to four senior officers. The Office of the Four-Year Plan, which possessed overall control of economic policy Europe-wide, also sent up to four officials. The Economics Ministry sent as many as three, although its influence in economic matterswith the possible exception of questions relating to currency -had been on the wane since the inception of the Four-Year Plan almost five years earlier.
The presence of two members of Rosenberg's staff, including the designated East Minister himself, was due to its responsibility for civil administration in the occupied East. The speed of the German advance, on which victory itself rested, was dependent on the ability of the supply apparatus to provide the troops with fuel, ammunition and food. Drastically restricting the transportation of food supplies to the troops and expecting them to feed themselves as far as possible from the occupied territories would relieve the considerable strain on the limited transport routes. These considerations explain the presence at the meeting of a senior member of the Transport Ministry. It is less clear why it was necessary for the Labour Ministry and the Reich Forestry Office each to send an official, though it was probably because both men sent sat on the General Council for the Four-Year Plan. Perhaps the only surprising absentee was a representative from the Office of the Army QuartermasterGeneral, which was responsible both for supplying the troops and for matters of military administration in the occupied territories.4' As already explained, however, there is no way of being absolutely certain who did and did not attend.
The average age of those present was approaching 50,42 though the ambitious and highly-valued Schlotterer and Riecke were only 35 and 41 respectively. Many of the participants were well-educated men; nigh on half held a doctorate. The majority of those who attended were salaried civil servants. A substantial proportion were in the Party, and although at least a third of those present were also members of the SS,43 for none of them was this their main function, unlike six of the fifteen men who attended the Wannsee Conference.
They were there on that spring day in Berlin first and foremost because of their expertise as economic specialists. This does not, however, place their ideological commitment to National Socialism in doubt. On the contrary, their enthusiasm for what they heard that day, despite their function as 'mere' bureaucrats, makes their ideological commitment all the more apparent. On 2 May 1941, they voiced their unequivocal endorsement of the priority to be given to supplying the German armed forces in the occupied Soviet territories.
By doing so, they not only declared their willingness to accept Soviet deaths from starvation on an unprecedented scale, but indeed stated that their objective could not be achieved without this enormous loss of life. Although the gains to be made from creating food surpluses by physically cutting off millions of Soviet consumers from their sources of nutrition were chiefly economic, it was the thoroughly racist view towards its intended victims of those responsible for formulating this strategy that made the contemplation of such an idea possible in the first place.
Although the parallels between the meeting of the Staatssekretaire in May 1941 and the meeting at Lake Wannsee in January 1942 have been highlighted here, the extent to which there was a direct linkage between the two meetings in terms of policy is less clear. In other words, did the importance of food and supply issues in German economic policy vis-a-vis the occupied Soviet territories shape nazi policy towards the Jewish population in those territories and influence the transition to genocide there?
In view of the fact that the principal victims of the 'starvation policy' were to be those living in the so-called 'wooded zone' of northern and central Russia At this stage in the planning process, however, preparations were already under way to deport Europe's Jews -presumably along with those Soviet Jews who survived the hostilities and the accompanying massacres -to the wastes of northern Russia, i.e. precisely those territories which were to be starved out. Thus, whilst this 'solution' may have been a territorial one, as opposed to one which provided for the immediate and systematic murder of Although the intention of deliberately producing mass starvation was incorporated at an early stage into occupation policy as a factor of fundamental importance, the whole notion was too insufficiently thought through to be described as a 'plan'.49 It can best be defined as a concept -it seems that there was no clear idea among the economic planners as to how it was actually to be implemented. It was uncertain exactly where and, above all, how it was to be applied in the occupied Soviet territories. There can be no doubt, however, either of the significance within official policy of this exterminatory approach or of the wide-ranging agreement obtained for it in advance of the German invasion.50
In any case, it soon proved impossible to implement the 'starvation policy', at least in the form in which it had originally been intended. With limited numbers of available troops and a military situation which rapidly began to deteriorate, it turned out to be impossible to cordon off whole regions and bring about the deaths of millions of people through starvation. In the event, thousands of Soviet civilians took to the country roads in search of food and trade on the black market thrived,s1 exactly what the economic planners had hoped and sought to avoid.52 The starving out of Leningrad between 1941 and 1943, to which at least 600,000 people fell victim, was an exception, and was only possible on this scale because substantial parts of two German armies were made available to take part in the siege."3 As a result of this unexpected scenario, the principal victims of the 'starvation policy' were ultimately the Soviet prisoners of war, who were viewed by the economic planners and the military leadership alike as the German troops' direct competitors for scarce food supplies. Although they had not been targeted explicitly prior to the invasion, it was clear to those responsible on exactly what scale the Wehrmacht could expect to capture Soviet troops, and yet they neglected to make the requisite preparations for feeding and sheltering the captured soldiers. 54 Thus, a consensus of opinion existed within the German leadership prior to the beginning of Barbarossa to the effect that the Soviet POWs would suffer gravely as a result of undernourishment. Given the obvious limits on their freedom of movement, in contrast to the majority of the Soviet civilian population, it was possible to segregate large numbers of captured Soviet soldiers and starve them to death. Thus, from the German point of view, the Soviet prisoners became the ideal victims of a policy seeking to isolate large groups of people who would otherwise have had to be fed from German-occupied territory and to let them starve."5 The fact that over three million Soviet prisoners died in German captivitys6 -the vast majority directly or indirectly as a result of undernourishment -is truly horrific, and yet the anticipated number of victims of the 'star-
